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In this thesis, I consider optimal redistributive income taxation under a
Mirrleesian framework while adding utility interdependence over labor choice
and analyze whether the optimal tax schedule is regressive or progressive. In
this environment, I show that optimal marginal income taxation could be pro-
gressive depending on the parameters of the model. There are two separate
forces that are at work in determining the optimal tax schedule. First, due
to the informational problems, there is a usual Mirrleesian force that works
towards the regressivity of taxes. Second e¤ect is a novel force that arises
from labor externality and has a progressive e¤ect on the income tax. This
e¤ect could be called as Pigouvian tax. Labor externality requires subsidies
for agents which are asymmetric according to productivities. Because of this
asymmetry, there should be higher subsidies for low types which has a pro-
gressive e¤ect on the optimal tax schedule. Pigouvian and Mirrleesian e¤ects
are in a multiplicative form in the tax function, therefore the tax schedule
is identied by the e¤ect which is more powerful. I also show that, when we
consider the labor interdependence, zero tax at the top of the skill distribution
result is no longer valid. Additionally, I show that even under full information
the market is not e¢ cient and there is a need for progressive income taxes, as
there is a need to correct the labor externality. Moreover, the numerical ex-
amples of the paper show the progressive e¤ect of labor externality on the tax
schedule. This additional concern about labor externality makes the income
taxation schedule more consistent with the current tax policies.
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·IS¸GÜCÜNÜN KARS¸ILIKLI BA¼GIMLI OLMASI DURUMUNDA
OPT·IMAL GEL·IR VERG·ILEND·IRMES·I
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Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Hakk¬Yaz¬c¬
Özet
Anahtar Kelimeler: Do¼grusal olmayan optimal vergilendirme, yeniden
da¼g¬t¬m, konumsal mallar.
Bu tezde, bireylerin fayda fonksiyonlar¬n¬n, her bireyin ba¼g¬ms¬z olarak
yapt¬¼g¬ i¸sgücü arz¬ tercihi kanal¬yla birbirine ba¼g¬ml¬ olabilece¼gi, di¼ger bir
ifadeyle emek d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬Mirrlees modeline eklenerek yeniden da¼g¬t¬mc¬ gelir
vergilendirme problemi ele al¬nm¬¸s ve optimal vergi tarifesinin azalan oranl¬m¬
yoksa artan oranl¬m¬olmas¬gerekti¼gi incelenmi¸stir. Bu yeni ortamda, optimal
marjinal gelir vergisi tarifesinin model parametrelerine ba¼gl¬olarak artan oranl¬
olabilece¼gi ortaya konmus¸tur. Optimal vergi tarifesini belirleyen birbirinden
ayr¬labilir iki farkl¬ dinamik bulunmaktad¬r. Bunlardan birincisi, asimetrik
bilgi problemi nedeniyle, vergilerin azalan oranl¬olmas¬na sebep olan, ola¼gan
Mirrlees etkisidir. ·Ikincisi ise emek d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬ndan do¼gan yeni bir etkendir ve
gelir vergisi üzerinde artan oranl¬etki yapmaktad¬r. Bu kuvvet, Pigou vergisi
olarak adland¬r¬labilir. Emek d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬, ki¸silerin üretkenliklerine göre asimetrik
olarak sübvansiyonlar gerektirmektedir. Bu asimetriden ötürü, düs¸ük üretken-
li¼ge sahip ki¸siler daha fazla sübvanse edilmelidir ve bu durum vergi tarifesi
üzerinde artan oranl¬bir etki yaratmaktad¬r. Pigou ve Mirrlees etkileri, vergi
fonksiyonunda çarp¬m s¸eklinde bulunurlar, bundan ötürü vergi tarifesi daha
güçlü olan etki taraf¬ndan belirlenir. Ayr¬ca bu tezde, emek d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬n¬göz
önünde bulundurdu¼gumuzda, üretkenlik da¼g¬l¬m¬n¬n en üst tabakas¬nda bulu-
nanlara s¬f¬r vergi oran¬uygulanmal¬sonucunun art¬k geçerli olmad¬¼g¬ortaya
konmus¸tur. Buna ek olarak, tam bilgi seviyesinde bile piyasan¬n etkin ol-
mad¬¼g¬n¬ve emek d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬n¬n etkilerini düzeltmek için artan oranl¬vergiye
ihtiyaç duyuldu¼gu tespit edilmi¸stir. Tezde verilen say¬sal örnekler emek d¬¸ssal-
l¬¼g¬n¬n vergi tarifesi üzerindeki artan oranl¬ etkisini göstermektedir. Emek
d¬¸ssall¬¼g¬krinin modele dâhil edilmesi, teorik vergi tarifesini, güncel vergi
politikalar¬yla daha tutarl¬hale getirmektedir.
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1 Introduction
The modern optimal income taxation literature started by the seminal work
of Mirrlees (1971). The idea behind this study was the trade-o¤ between
e¢ ciency and distributional concerns. Mirrlees indicates that a high marginal
tax rate implemented to the high productive worker will distort the labor
decision and leads to a disincentive for working. By integrating this incentive
consideration into the existing optimal income taxation literature, Mirrlees
had changed both the context and the direction of the debate.
According to Mirrlees (1971), when the e¢ ciency loss is considered, opti-
mal income taxation may follow a regressive fashion as the low income earners
should pay higher taxes than the high income earners. After Mirrlees, a huge
literature has developed. Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) showed that the op-
timal income tax implemented at the top of the income (ability) distribution
should be zero when there is a nite maximum to the skill distribution.1The
intuition here is simple; the disincentive e¤ect of the high taxes on productive
individuals causes a crucial e¢ ciency loss which leads to a considerable de-
crease in total welfare. By using log-linear skill distribution, Atkinson (1973),
Tuomala (1983,1990) showed that the optimal income tax is regressive as Mir-
rlees said. Furthermore according to Sadka (1976) even there is no disincentive
problem, the progressivity in the tax policy is not necessarily desirable.
There is an important conict between the theory of optimal income tax-
ation and the current tax policies as there is almost no country in the world
which has a regressive income tax schedule. It was an unexpected result to
have a regressive income tax schedule in theory, as Mirrlees confess.2 Con-
versely, Diamond (1998) has shown that if the skill distribution is unbounded,
1Diamond, P. (1998): Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern
of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates,American Economic Review, 88(1), 8395.
2I must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income-taxation in the
utilitarian manner to provide an argument for high taxes. It has not done so. [Sir James
A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation.]
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optimal tax schedule could be progressive in the upper tail of the income dis-
tribution. Saez (2001) mentioned that progressivity of the tax schedule could
be possible when the link between optimal tax formulas and elasticities of
earnings are considered. However these results are very sensitive to the skill
distribution assumptions. While Mirrlees and Tuomala are using Log-normal
skill distribution, Diamond and Saez use Pareto distribution for the upper tail
of the skill distribution, and this result does not hold when the distribution
assumption is changed.
In this study, I consider optimal redistributive income taxation under a
Mirrleesian framework while adding utility interdependence over labor choice
and analyze whether the optimal tax schedule is regressive or progressive.
Previous studies on optimal redistributive income taxation consider the con-
sumption externalities but ignore the labor interdependency of agents3. In
my setup, agentslabor decisions are a¤ecting each other and generating ex-
ternalities which lead to a utility interdependence among agents. The main
concern of the Mirrlees (1971) is information asymmetry that is agents are
heterogenous and productivity is private information of an individual. I add
labor externality to the Mirrlees setup and show that this additional concern
about labor interdependence entails government to intervene in order to cor-
rect these externality e¤ects. Although the widely accepted model states that
individuals derive disutility from their own work, V (l), people also care about
their position in the society. Instead of a form of disutility V (l), I use the com-
bination of their own and other peoples labor choice V (l; L), where L denotes
the average working hour in the society. Specically, if disutility depends on
the average work hour, the increase in an agents working hour has a positive
externality on other agents because it lowers the disutility of others.
In this environment, I show that optimal marginal income taxation could
be progressive depending on the parameters of the model. There are two sepa-
3Kanbur and Tuomala (2010), Oswald (1983), Samano (2009), Tuomala (1990).
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rate forces that are at work in determining the optimal tax schedule. First, due
to the informational problems, there is a usual Mirrleesian force that works
towards the regressivity of taxes. Second e¤ect is a novel force that arises
from labor externality and has a progressive e¤ect on the income tax. This
e¤ect could be called as Pigouvian tax. Labor externality requires subsidies
for agents which are asymmetric according to productivities. Because of this
asymmetry, there should be higher subsidies for low types which has a pro-
gressive e¤ect on the optimal tax schedule. Pigouvian and Mirrleesian e¤ects
are in a multiplicative form in the tax function, therefore the tax schedule is
identied by the e¤ect which is more powerful. In general it is not obvious
which force dominates the other. I provide conditions on parameters under
which optimal income tax schedule is progressive. These results show that if
we believe in the existence of labor interdependence, the progressivity of actual
tax systems can be rationalized. This is the main contribution of this study.
I also show that, when we consider the labor interdependence, zero tax at
the top of the skill distribution result is no longer valid. Additionally, I show
that even under full information the market is not e¢ cient and there is a need
for progressive income taxes, as there is a need to correct the labor externality.
The reason of this certain progressivity is the asymmetry of the externalities
generated by agents. Moreover, the numerical examples of the paper show the
change in tax schedule when there is labor externality, and these examples
also show that the societies which have a less dispersed skill distribution may
have a more progressive income tax schedule. This result is consistent with
the current tax policies when we look at the marginal tax data of the US and
Europe.
There are several studies that test the positional concerns of individuals
over the labor interdependency between agents. It is a historical fact, which
was mentioned by many economists like Thorstein Veblen, John Stuart Mill,
and Arthur Pigou, that people are a¤ecting each others labor decisions. Peo-
3
ple are also considering other peoples leisure or work hours as well as their
income and consumption. Veblen (1899) mentioned the importance of rela-
tive position in society, under the concept of "conspicuous consumption and
conspicuous leisure".4 Taxing of positional goods was pointed out by John
Stuart Mill 150 years ago.5 Arthur Pigou (1920) said that men do not de-
sire to be rich, but richer than other men.Pingle and Mitchell (2002), who
nd evidence of leisure positionality in a questionnaire-based study, mention
that most income is derived from allocating time toward labor and away from
leisure; any observed positional concern for income is potentially confounded
with a positional concern for leisure.
There are several micro level studies in labor economics and social psychol-
ogy have shown that each individual labor decision is dependent to the other
agents labor supply decisions. In economics, it is usually assumed that agents
are interacting only over the market. However, other social sciences pay at-
tention to direct interactions between the agents. Blomquist (1993) mentions
that if there are direct interactions, then the results and predictions are really
biased because of omitting these interactions. Grodner and Kniesner, (2006)
and (2009) showed that labor interdependency has a signicant e¤ect on the
agents labor supply decision. Aronsson, Blomquist, and Sacklén (1999) test
the hypothesis that individuals choices of hours of work are inuenced by the
4...the utility of both (conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption) alike for the
purposes of reputability lies in the waste that is common to both. In the one case it is a waste
of time and e¤ort, in the other it is a waste of goods. Both are methods of demonstrating the
possession of wealth, and the two are conventionally accepted as equivalents.The Theory
of the Leisure Class, 1899.
5 ...a great portion of the expenses of the higher and middle classes in most countries, and
the greatest in this, is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure a¤orded by the things on
which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea that certain expenses are
expected from them, as an appendage of station; and I cannot but think that expenditure
of this sort is a most desirable subject of taxation. If taxation discourages it some good
is done, and if not, no harm; for, in so far as taxes are levied on things which are desired
and possessed from motives of this description, nobody is the worse for them. "Principles
of Political Economy" MILL, 1848. (This is quoted in Carlsson et al. 2007.)
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average hours of work in a social reference group. Their results support the
hypothesis of interdependent behavior and neglecting the interdependence can
lead to serious underestimates of the labor supply e¤ects of income taxes. As
an empirical example Weinberg et al. (2004) nd that an extra hour worked
by the social reference group of an individual can increase the individuals to-
tal working hours by about 0.6 hours in United States. And there are several
other studies that veries the labor interdependency among agents6.
Surveys could be used in order to test concerns of people about other
individuals working hours, by asking them hypothetical questions regarding
their choices among alternative states. Pingle and Mitchell (2002) quoted the
survey study of Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and mentioned that some of
the responses Solnick and Hemenway identied as resulting from positional
concerns for income could have resulted because of positional concerns for
leisure.
There are several studies which discuss the optimal tax schedule with con-
sumption externalities, however my study investigates the e¤ect of labor ex-
ternality on the optimal marginal income tax schedule. Samano (2009) inves-
tigates the consumption externalities under the Mirrleesian setup, and men-
tioned the progressivity e¤ect of the consumption externality over tax sched-
ules. Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990) and Kanbur and Tuomala (2010) look at
the tax schedule when agents value their consumptions relative to the average
consumption. Kanbur and Tuomala (2010) nd support for greater progressiv-
ity in the tax structure as relative consumption concern increases. According
to Oswald (1983) if there is utility interdependence over consumption then
zero marginal tax at the top of the skill (income) distribution result does not
6Other studies about labor interdependency are; Baskaya, Y., and Kilinc, M. (2010),
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998), Becker and Murphy (2000) Glaeser, Sacerdote, and
Scheinkman (2003), Elster (1989), Fryer and Payne (1986), Jackson and Warr (1987),
Feather (1990), Platt and Kreitman (1990) and Platt, Micciolo and Tansella (1992).
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hold. Tuomala (1990) shows that optimal income taxes are progressive when
there is utility interdependence.
As far as I know, the optimal tax schedule with labor externalities under
a Mirrleesian framework has never been analyzed. This is the rst study that
shows labor interdependence has a progressive e¤ect on the optimal income
taxes. It is a common fact that current tax systems around the world are pro-
gressive. This study shows that by changing some underlying assumptions of
the economic model, the current tax systems of countries could be rationalized.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model,
section 3 presents the full information benchmark, section 4 presents the two-
type model under private information, section 5 presents the N-type model
under private information, section 6 and 7 investigate a specic form of util-
ity in two-type and N-type cases respectively, section 8 shows the numerical
examples, and section 9 concludes.
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2 Model
In section 3 and 4, I study the labor externality e¤ect on the tax policy in a
two-type model because it is easier to illustrate the results and the intuition
behind. In section 5 and 6, I analyze the general N-type model and show that
the results are general. As in Mirrlees (1971) agents are heterogeneous about
their privately known productivity levels. An agent with a productivity level
 has a separable utility function in the form of consumption and labor;
U(c; y; L; ) = u(c)  v(y

; L)
where c is consumption, y is agents income, and L =
nX
i=1
i
yi
i
is the average
working hour of the society. Production function is y = l; therefore labor is
l = y

, as number of work hours.
Assumptions of the model are as follows:
i) Preferences satisfy the usual assumptions that; u0(c) > 0; u00(c) < 0
and v1(
y

; L) > 0, v11(
y

; L) > 0:
ii) There are two additional assumptions that;
1-) v2(
y

; L) < 0 which means disutility decreases when L increases.
2-) v21(
y

; L) > 0 which means the agent who works more is getting
a higher disutility decrease from the increased L:
While agents are deriving utility from their consumption, as usual, working
is a source of disutility. In this setup they also derive utility from the increase
in the average working hour, because agents disutility is decreasing while
average working hour of the society is increasing.
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3 Full Information Benchmark and Ine¢ ciency
of the Laissez-Faire Market
In this section, I analyze the full information case as a benchmark. After
nding the allocation which the social planner o¤ers to the agents, the opti-
mal marginal income taxes under full information will be identied. Also the
planners allocation is compared with the Laissez-Faire market equilibrium in
order to have an idea on whether the market is e¢ cient or not.
3.1 Social Planning Problem Under Full Information
The aim of the social planner is to maximize the overall welfare of the society
while evaluating all agents equally by giving them the same weight. l and h
are the proportions of the low and high productive agents in the society and
they are normalized to 1, which means the summation of proportions is equal
to 1. When planner has full information, which means knowing each agents
productivity level, the social planners problem is as follows:
max
cl;ch;yl;yh
l

u(cl)  v

yl
l
; L

+ h
h
u(ch)  v
 yh
h
; L
i
subject to
hch + lcl  hyh + lyl
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
Letting  be the multiplier on the resource (feasibility) constraint, FOC
are as follows:
(cl) : lu
0(cl)  l = 0
(ch) : hu
0(ch)  h = 0
8
u0(cl) = u0(ch)
Therefore, under full information, consumption levels of the agents with
high and low productivities are equal.
cfh = c
f
l
(yl) : l
h
 v1(yll ; L) 1l   v2(
yl
l
; L)l
l
i
+ h
h
 v2(yhh ; L)
l
l
i
+ l = 0
(yh) : h
h
 v1(yhh ; L) 1h   v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
i
+ l
h
 v2(yll ; L)
h
h
i
+ h = 0
By using the FOC, the optimality conditions for both types can be char-
acterized.
Proposition 1 The conditions that characterize the social planners problem
are;
u0(ch) = v1(
yh
h
; L) 1
h
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
+ v2(
yl
l
; L) l
h
u0(cl) = v1(
yl
l
; L) 1
l
+ v2(
yl
l
; L)l
l
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)h
l
From High type agents FOC (ch) and (yh);
u0(ch) = v1(
yh
h
; L)
1
h
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)
h
h
+ v2(
yl
l
; L)
l
h
Left hand side of the equation is the marginal benet of one additional
unit of consumption. v1(
yh
h
; L) 1
h
term in the right hand side is the marginal
cost of working for one more unit of consumption. Because of the increased
average working hour, v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
term is the marginal benet for high type
while v2(
yl
l
; L) l
h
term is the marginal benet for low type. Second and third
terms are negative values, because disutility is decreasing while average work
hour is increasing. So it can be concluded as:
9
v1(
yh
h
; L)
1
h
> u0(ch)
Because working generates a positive externality which gives utility to each
agent, the cost of working for one more unit of consumption is not directly
equal to the marginal benet of consuming the additional good. As it is stated
in the proposition the positive externality e¤ect must be subtracted from the
marginal cost of working in order to get the marginal benet of additional
consumption.
From FOCs of Low type agent (cl) and (yl);
u0(cl) = v1(
yl
l
; L)
1
l
+ v2(
yl
l
; L)
l
l
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)
h
l
Terms are counterparts of high type terms for low the type agent, the
interpretation is same and again the second and third terms of the right hand
side are negative. So similarly it can be said that:
v1(
yl
l
; L)
1
l
> u0(cl)
3.2 Laissez-Faire Market
In order to compare with the social planner allocation, in this part, the paper
examines the Laissez-Faire market solution. In the market, agents know that
they derive utility from the average working hour, but they are not aware of
the fact that they can a¤ect the average working hour. Agents are maximizing
their utility subject to their resource constraint and their problem is as follows:
Agents Problem;
max
c;y
u(c)  v  y

; L

subject to
c  y   (y)
10
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
:
Letting  be the multiplier on the resource (feasibility) constraint, FOC
are as follows:
(c) : u0(c)   = 0
(y) :  v1(y ; L)1 +    0(y) = 0
which gives;
u0(c)(1   0(y)) = v1(y

; L)
1

where u0(c) is the marginal benet of one more unit of consumption, and right
hand side is the marginal cost of working in order to consume one more unit.
If there were no taxes, agents would equalize their costs and benets.
u0(c) = v1(
y

; L)
1

Theorem 1 Laissez-faire market allocation is ine¢ cient.
Proof. The condition that characterize the Laissez-faire market is u0(c) =
v1(
y

; L)1

. However this condition gives an ine¢ cient allocation, because agents
do not know that they cause a positive externality while they are working.
In fact when we consider this e¤ect, as the social planner does, the e¢ cient
allocation conditions are those in Proposition 1 and from those conditions it
is shown that v1(
y

; L)1

> u0(c) for both type.
Social planner knows the distortionary e¤ect of labor externality, that is
v1(
y

; L)1

> u0(c). In order to compensate the agents welfare, planner should
subsidize the agents. From these conditions one can say that there is no zero
marginal income tax under full information case. And both marginal taxes
should be negative,  0(yh) < 0 and  0(yl) < 0:
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3.3 Optimal Income Taxes Under Full Information
Marginal tax is an important public policy instrument which mainly cares
about the distributional concerns. To obtain an e¢ cient redistributive income
tax, social planner should take the market behavior of the agents into account.
In order to get the e¢ cient tax schedule, social planner uses the market con-
ditions of the taxes and determines the appropriate taxes for each agent. The
following part examines the optimal non-linear income taxes of each agent
under full information.
Proposition 2 Under full information (First-Best) with labor externalities,
i) Marginal Taxes are:
(1   0(yh)) = 1  1h
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)h + v2(
yl
l
; L)l
i
(1   0(yl)) = 1  1l
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)h + v2(
yl
l
; L)l
i
ii) Tax schedule is progressive:
 0(yh) >  0(yl):
Proof. From market solution it is known that marginal tax condition is;
(1   0(y)) = v1(
y

;L) 1

u0(c)
From FOC; u0(cl) = u0(ch)
Marginal Tax for High-type;
From (yh) : v1(
yh
h
; L) 1
h
h = h   v2(yhh ; L)
hh
h
  v2(yll ; L)
hl
h
From (ch) : u0(ch)h = h
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 
v2(
yh
h
;L)h
h
  v2(
yl
l
;L)l
h
(1   0(yh)) = 1  1h
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)h + v2(
yl
l
; L)l
i
Marginal Tax for Low-type;
From (yl) : v1(
yl
l
; L) 1
l
l = l   v2(yhh ; L)
hl
l
  v2(yll ; L)
ll
l
From (cl) : u0(cl)l = l
Dividing both side gives;
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(1   0(yl)) = 1 
v2(
yh
h
;L)h
l
  v2(
yl
l
;L)l
l
(1   0(yl)) = 1  1l
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)h + v2(
yl
l
; L)l
i
Disutility is decreasing while L is increasing, so both v2(
yh
h
; L) and v2(
yl
l
; L)
are negative terms. Since h > l one can conclude that;
(1   0(yl)) > (1   0(yh)) which means marginal tax is progressive;
 0(yh) >  0(yl)
The reason of this progressivity is the asymmetry of the externalities.
Agents are choosing their consumption and labor levels, and in order to in-
crease his income, a low type worker has to work more than a high type worker.
This means the positive externality that a low type generates when produc-
ing one unit of output is higher than the externality that a more productive
agent generates. Therefore social planner should tax the agents income while
considering this externality asymmetry. Taxes will be negative (subsidy) and
the low type worker will get more subsidy than the high type worker. This
additional concern about labor interdependency is eliminating the result of
zero marginal tax under full information.
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4 Social Planning Problem Under Private In-
formation
When we consider the information asymmetry, which arises when the produc-
tivity of agents is a private information of individuals and cannot be observed
by the social planner, the equally weighted Social Planning Problem becomes
as follows:
max
cl;ch;yl;yh
l

u(cl)  v

yl
l
; L

+ h
h
u(ch)  v
 yh
h
; L
i
subject to
hch + lcl  hyh + lyl ()
u(ch)  v
 yh
h
; L

 u(cl)  v

yl
h
; L

()
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
Letting  and  be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive compat-
ibility constraints respectively, FOC are as follows:
(cl) : lu
0(cl)  l   u0(cl) = 0
(ch) : hu
0(ch)  h + u0(ch) = 0
From (cl) and (ch);
u0(cl)
u0(ch)
= l(h+)
h(l )
u0(cl) > u0(ch):
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Under private information, marginal utility derived by the low type agent
from an additional consumption is greater than the marginal utility derived
by the high type. By the concavity of utility function one can conclude that
under private information, high ability worker consumes more than the low
productive one.
cph > c
p
l :
(yl) : l
h
 v1(yll ; L) 1l   v2(
yl
l
; L)l
l
i
+ h
h
 v2(yhh ; L)
l
l
i
+ l +

h
 v2(yhh ; L)
l
l
+ v1(
yl
h
; L) 1
h
+ v2(
yl
h
; L)l
l
i
= 0
(yh) : h
h
 v1(yhh ; L) 1h   v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
i
+ l
h
 v2(yll ; L)
h
h
i
+ h +

h
 v1(yhh ; L) 1h   v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
+ v2(
yl
h
; L)h
h
i
= 0
From the FOC of agents, social planners optimality conditions can be
derived.
Proposition 3 The conditions that characterize the social planners problem
are;
u0(ch) = v1(
yh
h
; L) 1
h
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
+
l
h
v2(
yl
l
;L)
h
h
i
 
h
v2(
yl
h
;L)
h
h
i
h+
u0(cl) = l(l )
h
v1(
yl
l
; L) 1
l
i
+ l
(l )
h
v2(
yl
l
; L)l
l
i
+ (h+)
(l )
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)l
l
i
+

(l )
h
 v1( ylh ; L) 1h   v2(
yl
h
; L)l
l
i
:
By integrating (ch) into (yh);
u0(ch) = v1(
yh
h
; L)
1
h
+ v2(
yh
h
; L)
h
h
+
l
h
v2(
yl
l
; L)h
h
i
  
h
v2(
yl
h
; L)h
h
i
h + 
v2(
yh
h
; L)h
h
term in the right hand side is the marginal benet that high
type gets from the labor externality and it is negative. And because l >  and
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by the cross derivative of v21 > 0 it can be said that v2(
yl
l
; L)h
h
> v2(
yl
h
; L)h
h
in absolute value, because the agent who is working more than the others,
will get a higher marginal benet from the increase in the average number of
working hour. Therefore the third term in the right hand side will also be
negative. So;
u0(ch) < v1(
yh
h
; L)
1
h
Labor externalities distort the condition for the market. In order to correct
this externality e¤ect, there must be a tax for the high type, which eliminates
well-known result: implementing zero marginal tax at the top of the ability
distribution.
From (cl) and (yl);
u0(cl) [l   ] = l
h
v1(
yl
l
; L) 1
l
i
+l
h
v2(
yl
l
; L)l
l
i
+(h+)
h
v2(
yh
h
; L)l
l
i
+

h
 v1( ylh ; L) 1h   v2(
yl
h
; L)l
l
i
Under private information, marginal cost of working could be higher or
lower than the marginal benet of consumption for low type agent. This
condition is identied by the two opposite e¤ects which are disincentive and
externality e¤ects. If the labor externality e¤ect is higher than the disincentive
e¤ect, low productive agent gets a subsidy as the high productive agent. The
size of the subsidies will identify the tax schedule.
Now I will investigate the optimal marginal tax schedule under private
information.
4.1 Optimal Marginal Income Taxes Under Private In-
formation
When information asymmetry is added to the model, the role of marginal
taxes are more crucial, because a higher tax above the optimal level will have
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a disincentive e¤ect on the high productive agent and would cause considerable
e¢ ciency losses.
Proposition 4 Marginal Taxes under private information with labor exter-
nalities are;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + h and (1   0(yl)) = (1 + l )	
where  =  
h
v2(
yh
h
; L) [h + ] + v2(
yl
l
; L)l   v2( ylh ; L)
i
and 	 =
h
l 
l 
i
:
Proof. From market solution it is known that marginal tax condition is;
(1   0(y)) = v1(
y

;L) 1

u0(c) :
Marginal Tax for High-type;
From (yh) : v1(
yh
h
; L) 1
h
[h + ] = h  v2(yhh ; L)
h(h+)
h
  v2(yll ; L)
hl
h
+
v2(
yl
h
; L)h
h
:
From (ch) : u0(ch) [h + ] = h:
Dividing both side gives:
(1   0(yh)) = 1  v2(yhh ; L)
(h+)
h
  v2(yll ; L)
l
h
+ v2(
yl
h
; L) 
h
Marginal Tax for Low-type;
From (yl) : v1(
yl
l
; L) 1
l

l   
v1(
yl
h
;L) 1
h
v1(
yl
l
;L) 1
l

= l v2(yhh ; L)
l(h+)
l
 v2(yll ; L)
ll
l
+
v2(
yl
h
; L)l
l
:
From (cl) : u0(cl) [l   ] = l:
Dividing both side gives:
(1   0(yl))
h
l 
l 
i
= 1  v2(yhh ; L)
(h+)
l
  v2(yll ; L)
l
l
+ v2(
yl
h
; L) 
l
where  is 0 <
v1(
yl
h
;L)l
v1(
yl
l
;L)h
< 1 because convexity of v(:) implies v1(
yl
l
; L) >
v1(
yl
h
; L):
Then the marginal taxes become:
(1   0(yh)) = 1  1h
h
v2(
yh
h
; L) [h + ] + v2(
yl
l
; L)l   v2( ylh ; L)
i
(1  0(yl)) =
n
1  1
l
h
v2(
yh
h
; L) [h + ] + v2(
yl
l
; L)l   v2( ylh ; L)
io h
l 
l 
i
Since  < 1 then 	 =
h
l 
l 
i
< 1.
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Cross derivative of v21 > 0; therefore v2(
yl
h
; L) < v2(
yl
l
; L) and v2(
yl
h
; L) <
v2(
yh
h
; L) in absolute value. Then the summation in the brackets is negative.
Let  =  
h
v2(
yh
h
; L) [h + ] + v2(
yl
l
; L)l   v2( ylh ; L)
i
we have  > 0
The marginal income taxes for both types are as follows:
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + h and (1   0(yl)) = (1 + l )	
Since h > l; it is obvious that 1+ h < 1+

l
: There fore the progressivity
of tax schedule is identied by the multiplication of (1 + 
l
)	:
When the tax schedule under labor interdependence is compared with the
Mirrlees taxes, it is seen that the disincentive and the externality e¤ects can
be separated. Following remark shows the tax functions of Mirrlees and labor
externality cases.
Remark 1 Labor externality is seen in a multiplicative fashion over the stan-
dard Mirrlees information problem. For the U(c) V (y

) form of utility Mirrlees
setup taxes are;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 and (1   0(yl)) = 	 where 	 = l l  < 1:
And when the Labor externality added to the model, the utility form becomes
U(c)  V (y

; L) and taxes are as follows;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + h and (1   0(yl)) = (1 + l )	:
Optimal marginal tax functions have two components that are Mirrleesian
and Pigouvian taxes. The term 1+ 
h
in high type tax is the term that comes
from labor externality. But in low type tax, 	 comes from private information
and it is a regressive force for taxation. On the other hand 1+ 
l
term comes
from the externality e¤ect and it is a progressive force for marginal tax. The
multiplication of these two opposite forces identies the tax schedule as regres-
sive or progressive. These two tax e¤ects can be distinguished as Mirrleesian
tax and Pigouvian tax. The force that makes the tax schedule regressive is
Mirrleesian tax and the tax that arise from externality could be called as
18
Pigouvian tax. In some cases where the externality e¤ect dominates the in-
formational problem e¤ect, low productive agent gets more subsidy than the
high productive one which forms a progressive marginal income tax schedule.
If 	 >
1+ 
h
(1+ 
l
)
marginal taxes are progressive, otherwise they have a regressive
form.
In general it is not obvious which component dominates, however I found
a condition on model parameters under which optimal tax schedule is always
progressive.
Proposition 5 Optimal marginal income tax schedule is progressive while
l ! 1
Proof. We know that 	 = 1, is su¢ cient condition for progressivity of taxes,
from the tax function dened by the equation:
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + h and (1   0(yl)) = (1 + l )	 , because h > l.
Therefore, if we show that liml!1	 = 1, then we can conclude that the
tax schedule will be progressive when l ! 1.
First, from the FOCs of the SPP, we have  = u
0(cl)u0(ch)
hu0(cl)+lu0(ch)
.
Then the limit of this term is given by:
liml!1  = liml!1
u0(cl)u0(ch)
hu0(cl)+lu0(ch)
= liml!1
u0(cl)u0(ch)
(1 l)u0(cl)+lu0(ch) = liml!1
u0(cl)u0(ch)
lu0(ch)
= u0(cl).
From FOCs we also know,  = l(1  u0(cl)) which results
liml!1  = liml!1 l(1  u0(cl)) =liml!1 1 
liml!1 
u0(cl)
= 0.
Finally, 	 is given by, 	 = l 
l  . Hence,
liml!1	 = liml!1
l 
l  = liml!1
l liml!1 
l  liml!1 
= liml!1
l 0
l :0 =1.
So, while low ability proportion, l, is increasing and reaches to 1, the
income tax schedule is going to have a progressive fashion for certain.
Here is the intuition for this result. The only source of regressivity is the
Mirrleesian component. As l goes to 1, incentive compatibility constraint
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multiplier  goes to 0. Therefore Mirrleesian e¤ect becomes less important.
So there exist a l high enough above which Pigouvian e¤ect always dominates
Mirrleesian e¤ect which means the optimal tax schedule is progressive.
Equations for marginal taxes contains endogenous variables. Therefore it
is impossible to give a precise condition over the model parameters that makes
the income schedule progressive.
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5 N-Type Case With General Utility Form
Before testing the model in a specic utility from, the paper investigates the
N-type problem in order to show the impossibility of having a precise condition
that makes the tax schedule progressive. It will be better to try the N-type
problem in a general utility form like u(c)   v(y

) + L. Because in the form
u(c)  v(y

; L) it is not possible to interpret the results easily. Then the social
planners problem will be in the following form:
max
ci;yi
"
NX
i=1
i(u(ci)  v

yi
i

+ L)
#
subject to
nX
i=1
ici 
nX
i=1
iyi ()
u(ci)  v

yi
i

 u(ci 1)  v

yi 1
i

(i)
L =
nX
i=1
i
yi
i
and 1 = 0
Letting  and i be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive com-
patibility constraints respectively, FOC are as follows:
(ci) : iu
0(ci)  i + iu0(ci)  i+1u0(ci) = 0
(cN) : Nu
0(cN)  N + Nu0(cN) = 0
(yi) : i
h
 v0(yi
i
) 1
i
i
+ i
i
+ i   iv0(yii ) 1i + i+1v0(
yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
= 0
(yN) : N
h
 v0(yN
N
) 1
N
i
+ N
N
+ N   Nv0(yNN ) 1N = 0
From these conditions, one can get the optimal tax schedule.
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Proposition 6 Marginal Taxes under private information with labor exter-
nalities are;
(1   0(yN)) = 1 + 1N
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + 1i )	i
where 	i =
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1
i
and  =
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1
Proof. Marginal Tax for type-N:
From the market; (1   0(y)) = v0(
y

) 1

u0(c)
From (yN) : v0(
yN
N
) 1
N
(N + N) = N +
N
N
From (cN) : u0(cN)(N + N) = N
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yN)) = 1 + 1N
Marginal Tax for type-i:
From (yi) : v0(
yi
i
) 1
i

i + i   i+1
v0( yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
v0( yi
i
) 1
i

= i +
i
i
From (ci) : u0(ci)(i + i   i+1) = i
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + 1i )
h
i+i i+1
i+i ii+1
i
where i =
v0( yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
v0( yi
i
) 1
i
< 1
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + 1i )	i where 	i =
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1 < 1
As in two-type model the tax functions has two separable e¤ects that are
Mirrleesian and Pigouvian taxes, and the tax schedule will be identied by
these two e¤ects. For a progressive tax schedule the following condition must
be satised.
Proposition 7 Optimal marginal tax schedule is progressive if and only if

i
u0(ci)
(1 i)[i+
]+i iu0(ci)
>

i+1
u0(ci+1)
(1 i+1)
h
i+i+1+
  iu0(ci)
i
+i+1
i+1
u0(ci+1)
i(i+1+1)
i+1(i+1)
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where 
 =
i 1X
j=1
j  
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1 i 1X
j=1
j
u0(cj)
and  =
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1
and
i =
v0( yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
v0( yi
i
) 1
i
Proof. When we look at ith and i+1th agents in the society, their tax functions
are as follows;
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + 1i )	i and (1   0(yi+1)) = (1 + 1i+1 )	i+1
where	i =
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1
i
and	i+1 =
i+1+i+1 i+2
i+1+i+1 i+1i+2 and  =
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1
If (1 + 1
i
)	i > (1 +
1
i+1
)	i+1 then the optimal taxation scheme will be
progressive.
For; (1 + 1
i
)
i+i i+1
i+i ii+1 > (1 +
1
i+1
)
i+1+i+1 i+2
i+1+i+1 i+1i+2
where i =
v0( yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
v0( yi
i
) 1
i
and i =
i 1X
j=1
j   
i 1X
j=1
j
u0(cj)
After plugging and manipulating the terms gives the condition:

i
u0(ci)
(1 i)[i+
]+i iu0(ci)
>

i+1
u0(ci+1)
(1 i+1)
h
i+i+1+
  iu0(ci)
i
+i+1
i+1
u0(ci+1)
i(i+1+1)
i+1(i+1)
where 
 =
i 1X
j=1
j  
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1 i 1X
j=1
j
u0(cj)
and  =
"
nX
j=1
j
u0(cj)
# 1
and
i =
v0( yi
i+1
) 1
i+1
v0( yi
i
) 1
i
This condition contains some endogenous variables, so it is impossible to
give a precise condition over exogenous parameters that make the tax progres-
sive in the N-type case. Next part of the paper assumes a specic form of
utility to interpret the results.
23
6 Private Information Case With Linear Util-
ities
Because 	 is determined by the endogenous variables in the general form of
utility, this part assumes a specic form of utility to interpret the results. Let
us assume the following form of utility and disutility functions which Diamond
(1998) uses:
u(c) = c and v
 
y

; L

=
 
y

   L
First, I will analyze the 2-type linear utility case, after that I will generalize
it to the N-type case.
6.1 Social Planner Problem With Linear Utilities
Social planner problem solves the following maximization problem: In this
kind of a utility form, without a weighting parameter incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding, and the problem is becoming meaningless. Therefore
social planner has to give weight to the low type agent more than the high
type, and the problem becomes:
max
cl;ch;yl;yh
'l

cl   (

yl
l

  L)

+ h

ch   (

yh
h

  L)

subject to
hch + lcl  hyh + lyl ()
ch  

yh
h

  L

 cl  

yl
h

  L

()
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
and ' > 1
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Letting  and  be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive compat-
ibility constraints respectively, FOC are as follows:
(cl) : 'l   l    = 0
(ch) : h   h +  = 0
(yl) : 'l
h
  y 1l
l
+ l
l
i
+ h
h
l
l
i
+ l + 
h

y 1l
h
i
= 0
(yh) : h
h
  y 1h
h
+ h
h
i
+ 'l
h
h
h
i
+ h + 
h
  y 1h
h
i
= 0
From the FOC of agents, social planner optimality conditions are derived
in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The conditions that characterize the social planners problem
are;

y 1h
h
= 1 + 1
h

y 1l
l
= (1 + 1
l
) 'l+h
'  

l

h
(' 'l h)
:
From the FOC of high type agent (yh) and (ch);
h
h
  y 1h
h
+ h
h
i
+ 'l
h
h
h
i
+ h + (h   h)
h
  y 1h
h
i
= 0
Manipulating the equation gives:
'l+h
h
+  = (
y 1h
h
) where  = 'l + h

y 1h
h
= 1 +
1
h
> 1 = u0(ch)
In the social planners e¢ cient allocation conditions, because of the labor
externalities, marginal cost of consumption is not equal to the marginal benet
of consumption for high type. So, planner should impose a tax on agents
income which leads to a tax at the top of the ability distribution.
(yl) and (cl) implies:
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'l
h
  y 1l
l
+ l
l
i
+ h
h
l
l
i
+ 'l   + 
h

y 1l
h
i
= 0
Manipulating the equation gives:

y 1l
l
h
'l    

l
h
i
= 'll
l
+ hl
l
+ 'l    where  = 'l   l
= 'll
l
+ hl
l
+ 'l   'l + l
= l(1 +
1
l
) where  = 'l + h

y 1l
l
= (1 + 1
l
) 'l+h
'  

l

h
(' 'l h)
The term 'l+h
'  

l

h
(' 'l h)
= 1 if only if l = 1 otherwise
'l+h
'  

l

h
(' 'l h)
< 1
The condition for low productive agent is not as clear as the condition of
the agent with high productivity. The informational problem and the labor
externalities will identify the condition for low type.
6.2 Optimal Marginal Income Taxes With Linear Util-
ities
In order to identify taxes, the optimal tax condition must be obtained from
the market. The condition is derived from the agents problem. The agents
problem as follows:
max c  (y

) + L
subject to
c  y   (y)
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
Letting  is the feasibility constraint multiplier, FOC are as follows:
(c) : 1   = 0
(y) :   y 1

+    0(y) = 0
(1   0(y)) = y
 1
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Where  y
 1

marginal cost of one more unit of consumption. When tax
is zero, agents would equalize the marginal benet and cost of additional one
more unit of consumption.
MB = u0(c) = 1 =  y
 1

=MC
The next proposition shows the optimal taxes for both agents.
Proposition 9 If the utilities are linear, under private information with labor
externalities, marginal taxes are:
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + 1h
(1   0(yl)) = (1 + 1l )	 where 	 =
h(h+'l)
'h 'l +l h+'l l
Proof. Marginal Tax for High-type;
From (yh) : 
y 1h
h
(h + ) = h +
hh
h
+ 'lh
h
From (ch) : h +  = h
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + 1h
Marginal Tax for Low-type;
From (yl) : 
y 1l
l
"
'l   

y 1
l

h

y 1
l

l
#
= l +
hl
l
+ 'll
l

y 1l
l
h
'l    

l
h
i
= l +
l
l
From (cl) : 'l    = l
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yl)) = (1 + 1l )
h
'l 
'l 
i
where  =
l
h
< 1
(1   0(yl)) = (1 + 1l )	 where 	 =
h
'l 
'l 
i
< 1
 = 'l + h and  = 'l   l('l + h) then;
	 =
h(h+'l)
'h 'l +l h+'l l
In the tax function of high type, the term 1 + 1
h
is the labor externality
e¤ect. For high type the information problem e¤ect is 1. On the other hand
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for low type agent while labor externality e¤ect term is 1+ 1
l
; the disincentive
e¤ect is 	: Therefore the optimal tax schedule will be identied by these two
multiplicative e¤ects. Following proposition gives the condition that makes
the optimal tax schedule progressive.
Proposition 10 Optimal tax schedule is progressive if and only if
+1h (h+'l)
hl' +1l (' h 'l)
> h+1
l+1
:
Proof. For a progressive tax schedule it must be the case that;
(1   0(yl)) > (1   0(yh)):
(1 + 1
l
)	 > 1 + 1
h
plugging 	 = 

h(h+'l)
'h 'l +l h+'l l and rearranging the terms gives the con-
dition.
In this proposition, the condition that makes the tax schedule progressive
consists of the exogenous parameters. So with the appropriate parameters tax
schedule have to be progressive. This result shows that if we add the labor
interdependency over to the standard Mirrleesian setup, under this condition
there could be a progressive income tax schedule.
The proposition below, gives the First-Best case with the weighting para-
meter being 1, which makes incentive compatibility constraint multiplier 0.
Proposition 11 Problem becomes the First-Best case when ' = 1, and opti-
mal marginal tax schedule is progressive.
Proof.  = 'l   l('l + h) = l   l(l + h) = 0
Incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. In the First-Best;
(1   0(yh)) = 1 + 1h
(1   0(yl)) = (1 + 1l )
h
'l 
'l 
i
' = 1 and  = 0 then (1   0(yl)) = (1 + 1l )
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Since h > l, 1 + 1l > 1 +
1
h
: This means there is progressive marginal
income taxation.
 0(yh) >  0(yl)
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7 N-type Case With Linear Utilities
In this section, the economy is populated by N agents and the utility function
is linear. Social planners problem is as follows:
max
ci;yi
"
NX
i=1
!ii(ci  

yi
i

+ L)
#
subject to
nX
i=1
ici 
nX
i=1
iyi ()
ci  

yi
i

+ L  ci 1  

yi 1
i

+ L (i)
L =
nX
i=1
i
yi
i
and i < i+1
Letting  and i be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive com-
patibility constraints multiplier respectively, FOC are as follows:
(ci) : !ii   i + i   i+1 = 0
(cN) : !NN   N + N = 0
(yi) : !ii
h
  y 1i
i
+ i
i
i
+ i   i y
 1
i
i
+ i+1
y 1i
i+1
= 0
(yN) : !NN
h
  y 1N
N
+ N
N
i
+ N   N y
 1
N
N
= 0
Following proposition shows the optimal tax schedule in N-type case.
Proposition 12 If the utilities are linear, under private information with la-
bor externalities, marginal taxes are:
(1   0(yN)) = 1 + !NNN
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + i!ii )	i where 	i =
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1
i
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Proof. Marginal Tax for type-N:
From (yN) : 
y 1N
N
(!NN + N) = N +
!NNN
N
From (cN) : !NN + N = N
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yN)) = 1 + !NNN
Marginal Tax for type-i:
From (yi) : 
y 1i
i
24!ii + i   i+1  y 1ii+1

y 1
i

i
35 = i + !iiii
From (ci) : !ii + i   i+1 = i
Dividing both side gives;
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + i!ii )
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1
i
where i =
i
i+1
< 1
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + i!ii )	i where 	i =
h
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1
i
< 1
The condition that makes the optimal tax schedule progressive is in follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 13 Optimal marginal tax schedule is progressive if and only if
i
(1  

i

i+1
)[i!i+
]+

i

i+1
[i]
> i+1
(1  

i+1

i+2
)[!ii+i+1!i+1+
 i]+

i+1

i+2
[i+1]
i(i+1+i+1!i+1)
i+1(i+i!i)
where 
 =
i 1X
j=1
!jj   (
nX
j=1
!jj)
i 1X
j=1
j and  =
nX
j=1
!jj:
Proof. When we look two ith and i+1th agents in the society their tax functions
are;
(1   0(yi)) = (1 + i!ii )	i and (1   0(yi+1)) = (1 +
i+1!i+1
i+1
)	i+1
If (1 + i!i
i
)	i > (1 +
i+1!i+1
i+1
)	i+1 then the optimal taxation scheme will
be progressive.
For;
(1 + i!i
i
)
i!i+i i+1
i!i+i ii+1 > (1 +
i+1!i+1
i+1
)
!i+1i+1+i+1 i+2
!i+1i+1+i+1 i+1i+2
31
 =
nX
j=1
!jj and i =
i
i+1
and i =
i 1X
j=1
!jj   (
nX
j=1
!jj)
i 1X
j=1
j
Plugging these terms and rearranging them gives the condition;
i
(1  

i

i+1
)[i!i+
]+

i

i+1
[i]
> i+1
(1  

i+1

i+2
)[!ii+i+1!i+1+
 i]+

i+1

i+2
[i+1]
i(i+1+i+1!i+1)
i+1(i+i!i)
In an N-type economy, if the parameters are satisfying the condition stated
in the proposition, the optimal income tax schedule should be in a progressive
form. As it was shown before in the paper, in a general utility form the
condition that makes the tax schedule has some endogenous parameters which
makes it impossible to have an analytical solution. However in a specic form
of utility such as linear utility, it is possible to have a analytical solution over
the exogenous parameters.
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8 Numeric Examples
In this part of the paper, I give numeric examples with log utility in order
to see the change in tax schedules when labor interdependence is considered.
Because Mirrlees (1971) uses log-utility as an example, in order to be consistent
and be able to see the e¤ect of labor externality, the paper uses the same form
of utility function.
8.1 Log-Utility N-type
First of all, I analyze the N-type model with log-utility which Mirrlees (1971)
uses. The social planner problem that maximizes the total welfare is as follows.
max
ci;yi
"
nX
i=1
i(log ci + log(1  yi
i
) + L)
#
subject to
nX
i=1
ici 
nX
i=1
iyi ()
log ci + log(1  yi
i
)  log ci 1 + log(1  yi 1
i
) ()
L =
nX
i=1
yi
ni
and i < i+1
In order to compare with the Mirrlees case, rst, I give the Mirrlees results.
The parameters are as follows: There are 100 agents, rst agents productivity
is 2, it increases by 0.01 and reaches 3 for most productive agent. The tax
schedule is as in the Figure 1. As seen in the graph, marginal taxes are positive,
decrease in upper tail and show a regressive fashion. With the same parame-
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ters, the marginal tax schedule under interdependency is shown in Figure 2. In
this case, marginal taxes are negative and increasing. In other words, subsidies
are decreasing while agents productivity is increasing. But these results are
sensitive to number of agents and the productivity di¤erence between agents.
In Figure 3, population and rst agent productivity is the same but produc-
tivity increment is 0.04. In this case, marginal tax is going to be regressive in
the upper tail. This consideration could be an explanation of why European
countries like Germany, France, Belgium has a more progressive marginal in-
come tax schedule than the US. The studies that are using the International
Adult Literacy Survey shows that the skills are more unequally distributed in
the US than in the EU. The productivity di¤erences in Europe are less than
the US. And in Figure 4, rst agent productivity and productivity increment
is the same with Figure 2, but this time population increases to 200. Again in
this case, marginal tax decreases in upper tail.
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Figure 1
N = 100
 2 f2; 2:01; 2:02:::3g
 = 1=100
This graph shows the standard Mirrlees optimal income taxation result
where the marginal tax is regressive in the upper tail of the skill distribution.
The tax is generally positive and after it increases up to the middle of the skill
distribution, it starts to decrease while productivity increases. A higher skill
dispersion makes the tax schedule even more regressive.
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N = 100
 2 f2; 2:01; 2:02:::3g
 = 1=100
As it is seen in Figure 2 that with exactly the same parameters, when
the labor externality added to the model, the optimal tax schedule seen in
a progressive fashion. When the taxes are negative, it means that low type
agents get more subsidies than the high ones. As it is mentioned in the text,
a low type agent has to work more than the high type in order to increase his
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income at same amount. Therefore the asymmetry of externalities generated
by agents is the reason of tax progressivity. But, as one would expect that the
shape of the optimal income tax schedule is sensitive to the distribution of skills
within the population. As shown in Figure 3, while the ability distribution
getting dispersed, the optimal tax schedule is going to have a regressive fashion
in the upper tail.
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Figure 3
N = 100
 2 f2; 2:04; 2:08:::6g
 = 1=100
This change in tax policy shows that we can expect an even more regres-
sive income schedule in the societies that have a more dispersed skill distribu-
37
tion. From the Tax Database of OECD, the European countries like Germany,
France, Netherlands, Belgium has a more progressive marginal tax schedule
than the US.7 And it is also known that according to the studies that are
mostly using the International Adult Literacy Survey shows that the skills
are more unequally distributed in the US than in the EU. The productivity
di¤erences in Europe are less than the US.8
Following graph shows the e¤ect of population increase while the skill in-
crement is same.
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Figure 4
7OECD Tax Database, or the marginal tax calculation in Mankiw et al. (2009).
8There are several studies that uses this fact and try to explain some other economic
isues. Devroye and Freeman (2000) "Does Inequality in Skills Explain Inequality of Earnings
Across Countries?" and Bombardini, Giovanni Gallipoli and Pupato (2011), "Skill Disper-
sion and Trade Flows".
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N = 200
 2 f2; 2:01; 2:02:::4g
 = 1=200
This gure shows that when the ability di¤erence is increasing between the
rst and the last agent, the income tax schedule is going to have a regressive
fashion.
8.2 Log-Utility 2-type
The social planners maximization problem is as follows.
max
cl;ch;yl;yh
l

log cl + log

1  yl
l

+ L

+ h

log ch + log

1  yh
h

+ L

subject to
hch + lcl  hyh + lyl ()
log ch + log

1  yh
h

+ L  log cl + log

1  yl
h

+ L ()
L = h
yh
h
+ l
yl
l
First, I will give the results of the two type model; while l is constant,
h is increasing. In this case
h
l
matters. In order to compare with Mirrlees
result, rst I will give the result of Mirrlees two type case in Figure 5 when
the parameters are as follows: Proportions of each agent are 0.5 and l is 3
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and h starts from 3.1 and iterates 100 times and nally reaches 13. The tax
schedule is as in Figure 5.
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Figure 5
l = 3
h 2 f3:1; 3:2; 3:3; :::13g
 = 0:5 for both type
This result reecting the analytical solution of Mirrlees problem in a two
type model. The tax of high productive worker is zero, but there is positive
tax on low type and it is increasing while the ability di¤erence is increasing.
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With the same parameters, Figure 6 shows the case when labor externality is
added to the model.
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Figure 6
l = 3
h 2 f3:1; 3:2; 3:3; :::13g
 = 0:5 for both type
When labor externality is added, tax schedules turn to be negative values
and low type agent gets more subsidy which means a progressive marginal tax.
In order to see the e¤ect of proportion of low type agents, I give two examples
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while other parameters are the same. While in Figure 7, low type proportion
is 0.8, in Figure 8 low type proportion is 0.2.
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l = 3
h 2 f3:1; 3:2; 3:3; :::13g
l = 0:8
h = 0:2
This gure shows that an increase in the proportion of low type agents
causes a stronger progressive taxation.
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l = 0:2
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In Figure 8 the proportion of low type agent is 0.2. When the low type
agents proportion is too small, the tax policy could be regressive. However
while the productivity di¤erence increases, the tax schedule turns to a pro-
gressive fashion.
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Following part shows an example of two-type model, using log utility. And
the analysis shows the e¤ects of change in low type proportion and ability dif-
ference at the same time. Proportion of low type starts from 0.1 and increases
by 0.09, iterates 10 times and becomes 1. l is 1 and h is starting from 1 and
increases by 0.2 and at the end reaches to 3. Three graphs are showing high
type tax, low type tax and the tax di¤erence respectively. As it can be seen
on the graphs, high type marginal tax is increasing while proportion of low
type and productivity of high type are increasing. Low type tax is increasing
with the increase in the productivity of the high type. It shows a slightly
decreasing pattern while the proportion of low type is increasing. The last
graph shows the tax di¤erence; if it is above zero, that means marginal tax
is progressive. We can see that after a certain level of l optimal taxation is
always progressive.
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Figure 9 shows that high type tax is identied by both low type proportion
and the productivity change of high type. These two changing parameters
have a joint e¤ect on the tax of highly productive agent.
45
0 2 4
6 8 10
0
5
10
-0.65
-0.6
-0.55
-0.5
-0.45
-0.4
Low-Type ProportionHigh-Type Productivi ty
Lo
w
-T
yp
e 
Ta
x
Figure 10
l = 1
h 2 f1:2; 1:4; 1:6; :::3g
l 2 f0:1; 0:19; 0:28; :::1g
h 2 f0:9; 0:81; 0:72; :::0g
Figure 10 shows that low type tax is generally identied by the productivity
di¤erence. Low type proportion has less inuence on the tax di¤erence.
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l = 1
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This gure illustrates the same thing that proposition 5 says in the model
that there is a critical l value that, after this proportion, the income tax
schedule will be progressive.
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9 Conclusion
In this study, I have presented a model which contains the utility interde-
pendence over labor choice among the agents. The results showed that labor
externality has a progressive e¤ect on optimal tax schedules. Even in the full
information case, because of the labor externality, there will be a negative
taxes for all agents, and taxes are increasing with the increase in productivity.
This additional concern is eliminating the result that there should be a zero
tax at the top of the skill distribution. The model in the paper is implementing
a tax even to the highest productive agent.
In private information case, the tax is consisting of two separate parts. One
is due to the informational problem that Mirrlees stated. And the second is due
to the labor externality e¤ect. While labor externality has a progressive force
on marginal tax, information asymmetry has a regressive force. As it is shown
in the paper, with the appropriate parameters externality e¤ect dominates the
informational problem e¤ect and tax schedule becomes in a progressive form.
Also the numerical examples are reecting the tax schedule changes when
labor externality is added to the standard Mirrlees optimal taxation problem.
This additional concern about labor externality makes the income taxation
schedule more consistent with the current tax policies. With these corrective
concerns that makes the models environment even closer to the real life, the
progressivity of actual tax systems can be rationalized.
I understood from this study that corrective concerns about the model are
make the model even closer to the real life. I analyzed the labor e¤ect solely.
I believe that adding the consumption and labor externalities or any other
considerations at the same time may better explain why the tax policies are
in the current state.
Furthermore, while it is easier to see the intuition in an N-type model, in the
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literature there are several studies working with continuum agents. Therefore
it could be further work to study labor interdependence in taxation problem
with a continuum agent model.
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